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Defendants.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant has listed numerous issues on appeal;

the

issues on appeal as following:
1.) Whether Appellant has waived the right to appeal
magistrate court's grant
summary judgment in favor of Respondent where she failed to comply with the Idaho
Appellate Rules on appeal to the district cOUli.

2.) Whether Appellant has waived all of her issues presented on appeal by failing to have
raised those issues below and/or by failing to support each issue as required by the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
3.) Whether there was substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's
findings of fact and whether its conclusions of law follow from those findings.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case
This is a post-foreclosure eviction action that has been ongoing since 2011 in which
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") seeks restitution of the premises
commonly known as 10512 W. Achillea Street, Star, Idaho 83669 (hereinafter referred to as
"The Property") pursuant to a Trustee's Deed. The trial court/magistrate court granted summary
judgment in favor of Freddie Mac on November 25, 2011 and Appellant appealed to the district
court.

court

the

court on

23, 20 3

.

IS

.

agam

On July 12, 2011, Freddie Mac filed a post-foreclosure eviction complaint for ejectment
and restitution of property. (Clerk's Record on Appeal CR.

") at 6-11.)

matter was

assigned to the Honorable Christopher M. Bieter, Magistrate Judge. (Jd.) Named as defendants
were Margaret A. Butcher, Dennis D. Butcher, and John Does 1-10

true identify is

unknown, as occupants of The Property. (Id.).
Appellant, Margaret A. Butcher (aka Margaret McCluskey) was the only party to appear,
tiling a Notice of Appearance on August 1, 2011. (R. 18.) On August 16, 20 II, Appellant filed a
37 page Answer setting forth no counterclaims and asserting what she characterized as 107
different affirmative defenses. (R.21-57.) Appellant's Answer admitted that she was occupying
The Property and that she executed a promissory note and granted a deed of trust, as security for
that note, on The Property. (R. 23-25.) Appellant generally denied all of the other salient
allegations set forth in the Complaint. (Id.)
Based upon Appellant's concessions, on September 28, 2011, Freddie Mac filed its
motion for summary judgment. (R. 70.) That motion was supported by an affidavit of counsel
which provided the court with true and correct copies of the

compliance

foreclosure statutes

court
a

-2-

a true and correct copy
Appellant's Deed of Trust,

a

stay

beneficiary on

which was not objected to and

bankruptcy court on October 18,2010. (R. 72-113.)
Freddie Mac's motion for summary judgment was then set for hearing on November 1,
2011. (R. 126-127.) Appellant did not file any response to the motion but instead appeared at the
1, 2011 hearing in person at which time upon stipulation of

hearing

was re-set for November 22, 2011. (R. 128-131.) A notice of continued hearing was then filed,
resetting Freddie Mac's motion for summary judgment to be heard on November 22, 2011 and
specifically providing that any response was to be filed on or before November 15, 2011. (R.
130-131.)
On November 15,2011, Freddie Mac received a packet of materials in excess of81 pages
including what appeared to be various exhibits and which appeared to contain an amended
answer, without leave of the court, and attaching a pleading titled "Response to Motion for
Summary Judgment," which was merely a compilation of answers to facts set forth in the
Complaint and in the motion for summary judgment, discussion of affirmative defenses and
discussion

a counterclaim, which also was not appropriately filed with the court. (R.135-136.)
as a response to the pending

3

for

Freddie

responding parties, as
notice

as a true and correct copy

the

rescheduled sale. (R. 14 -160.)1
Thereafter, at the November 22, 2011 hearing on Freddie Mac's motion for summary

judgment, Appellant informed the court that the clerk's office would not accept her packet
documents for filing. (R. 163; See also R. 164-554.) Freddie Mac, having received the packet of
material previously did not oppose the court' s acceptance and review of
were then filed by the Clerk. (R. 163-554.) The court then heard oral argument from both sides
and advised Appellant that it would read all of the filed materials. (Tr., p. 14:5-7.)
The matter having been fully briefed by both sides and oral argument having been
completed, on November 25,2011, the magistrate court issued its written ruling granting Freddie
Mac's motion for summary judgment requiring Appellant to surrender The Property. (R.554558.) Thereafter, on December 5, 2011, Appellant filed what was titled as a "Motion Re: Reply
Memorandum," which was in excess of 60 pages. (R. 559-623.)

Appellant did not seek

reconsideration of the magistrate court's order granting summary judgment or leave to file the
additional brief opposing the summary judgment motion, and thus, the court did not take any

I Appellant's Opening Brief takes issue with the magistrate court's acceptance of Freddie Mac's November 21,2011
Reply Memorandum in
of Motion for
Judgment, contending that she was somehow
submitted
the late filings and/or the court erred by
its written decision on the matter before
December 5, 20 i 1 filing. (See
pg. 2 and 15.) In so arguing,
overlooks the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure which do not
her with the right to file anything other than a response to motion for
which Freddie Mac received on or about November 15, 2011 and which the court
at
on November 22, 201 and indicated it would review
to issuing its written decision dated
20 1.
LR.C.P.
for the
of a
and
did not ask it to reconsider
after the court issued its November 25, 20
did she seek to strike or to otherwise exclude Freddie Mac's
as will be discussed in greater detail below. she
memorandum and
affidavit of Jeff Stenman.
lvlichalk v.
148 Idaho
220 P .3d
586
has now
such arguments on
UUt,HH.HC,

-4-

5, 2011

respect to

also

not

to

s reply memorandum in support of summary judgment or

or exclude

affidavit of Jeff Stenman. (R. 2.)
Instead, on December 9, 2011, Appellant filed a 22 page Notice of Appeal to the district
court. (R. 624-645.) The appeal was assigned to the Honorable Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen on
December 9,

1 1.

Governing Procedure on Appeal was issued on December 1

an

2011. (R. 646-650.) Thereafter, Appellant filed a number of various inappropriate motions
including a 45 page Motion: Declaratory Relief and Quiet Title (R. 682-726.) and a 47 page
Motion: Compulsory Counterclaim in Recoupment (R. 727-773.) On February 29, 2012, the
district court issued a temporary stay pending the appeal and ordered Appellant to make $500.00
monthly payments to the Clerk of the Court. (R. 775-777.)
On March 22, 2012, Appellant filed her opening brief, which was in excess of 150 pages
including attached exhibits. (R.778-947.) Appellant's opening brief failed to comply with
virtually all of the Idaho Appellate Rule 35 requirements, including a lack of table of contents,
table of authorities, statement of the case, issues presented on appeal, and supporting argument
section. CR. 987-999.) Thereafter, on April 24, 2012, Freddie Mac filed its Appeal Brief. (R.
948-959.)

was

scheduled

19, 2012

was
pro

se,

to

-5~

Appellate

notwithstanding

granting summary judgment

failure, affirming
on

magistrate

23,2013.

s

984-995.)

On July 2, 2013 and July 25, 2013, Appellant filed her Notice of Appeal and Amended
Notice of Appeal respectively. (R. 996-1006.) Since that time, the stay preventing Freddie Mac
from taking possession of the property has expired and both the distlict court as well as this
Court have declined multiple requests

Appeliant to continue that

Order Denymg

Verified Ex-Parte Application for Temporary Stay, entered on December 19, 2013 and Order
Denying Application for Full Stay, entered on December 27,2013.) Freddie Mac has possession
of the Property.

Statement of Facts
On or about December 15, 2005, Appellant and her former husband borrowed $147,000
for the purchase of The Property and in doing so executed a note and deed of trust which deed
was recorded in the Ada County land records as Instrument No. 105191493. (R. 951.)
Ultimately, the payment obligations due under the Note and Deed of Trust went into default and
a Notice of Default was recorded in the Ada County land records as Instrument No. 110050723.
(R. 10.)
15,2010.

was

556.)
0,

was sent to

to an
vias

5,

o.

on
1

kJ,,-,'JCVJlll

3,

10,

10 which

sale;

was granted

court. (Id.)

on

After the bankruptcy stay was lifted, the Trustee's sale of the property was rescheduled
for May 16, 2011. (Id.)

Notice

rescheduled sale, was again sent by certified mail to

Appellant on April 1, 2011, and published in the Idaho Business Review on April 15,22, and 29,
201 .

)

s

\vas

s

a

was

in favor of Freddie

and recorded in the Ada County land records as Instrument No. 111041753. (ld.; R. 952.) The
Trustee's Deed provides that Freddie Mac bought the property at the May 16, 2011 sale with a
credit bid of$123,000.00? (Jd.)
Notwithstanding the Trustee's sale of the property, Appellant failed to vacate The
Property and she continued to occupy the Property up until her last attempt to stay execution of a
Writ of Ejectment was denied by this Court on December 27, 2013. (R. Order Denying
Application for Full Stay, entered on December 27, 20l3.)
ARGUMENT

Throughout these entire proceedings, Appellant has done nothing more than inundate the
court and the record with voluminous filings and conclusory allegations making no attempt to
support her allegations

court

to

to search

devotes almost her entire
to whether Freddie Mac was entitled to submit a credit bid. As is
the record reveals that this is the first time she is
this issue and as
she
discussed in greater detail
has waived the
to do so because she did not present the issue before the
court such that an
record could be
and her concerns addressed
the
confirmed the same failure to "nr,r()r,ri
issue before the
court

-7-

VA'-'HAL''''''''

error. Ultimately, it is not
support for

s or

to

s allegations.

As is discussed in greater detail below, the present appeal should be denied both on
procedural grounds as well as on the merits. First, Appellant has waived all of the issues she
now seeks to raise before this Court because she failed to raise the issues before the magistrate
court and the district court on

to

Rule 35(a)(6) with respeet to at least half of her identified issues on appeal, by completely failing
to provide this Court with any argument, analysis, authority, or citations to ease law and/or the
record to support such issues.

Lastly, Appellant fails to specifically ehallenge any of the

magistrate court's findings of fact or conclusions of law and this Court should refi"ain from
searehing the record for error where Appellant fails to meet her burden of showing error.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In her opening brief, Appellant asserts that she is appealing to this Court "for de novo
review" and attempts to argue purported issues of material fact that she claims to have presented
both before the magistrate court and the district court on appeal. (See Appellant's Brief, pg. 3, ,-r

3; see also pg. 6, Issues Presented on Appeal.)
from this Court specifically
in its

so arguing, Appellant disregards recent case
a district court

as an

-8-

the district
decision as a matter
procedure. Bailey v. Bailey, 153
526, 529,
973
1
v.
45
Thus,
672, 183 P.3d 758,760
the magistrate court. Jd. "Rather, we are 'procedurally bound to affirm or reverse
the decisions of the district court.'" !d. (quoting State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415
n. 1, 224 P.3d 480,482 n. 1 (2009)). Prior to Losser, when this Court reviewed a
district court acting in its appellate capacity the standard of review was: "when
reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court
will review the record and the magistrate court's decision independently of, but
with due regard for, the district court's decision."
, 145 Idaho at 672, 183
at
Losscr,
not
s
decision. !d. Rather, it is bound to affirm or reverse the district court's decision.
See Bailey, 153 Idaho at 529, 284 P.3d at 973; Korn, 148 Idaho at 415 n. 1,224
P.3d at 482 n. 1. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.3d 214,217-18
(2013).
Turner v. Turner,

Idaho _ _, 317 P.3d 716, 719-720 (2013).

In conducting such a

"deferential review, the evidence must be liberally construed in favor of the judgment entered."
Id.

II.

APPELLANT HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO ALLEGE ASSIGNMENTS OF
ERROR WITH RESPECT TO THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S RULINGS BY
FAILING TO ABIDE BY THE IDAHO APPELLATE RULES ON HER APPEAL
TO THE DISTRICT COURT.
Appellant should be deemed to have waived the right to allege assignments of error with

respect to the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment because she failed to abide by the
Appellate Rules on her initial appeal to
any
to

the issues

district court. Thus, Appellant has failed to

she now

on

to

to
more

Cl.!

a

IS

to

a

1I1ca.

at

1S

3

is not allowed

This Court has previously stated as follows:
pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those litigants
represented by an attorney. See, e.g. Rizzo v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
39611,
2013 WL 2232287 at *10 (May 22, 2013). Thus, this Court has refused to
consider an appellant's claims "because he has failed to support them with either
relevant argument and auth01ity or coherent thought." Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho
1
an
to assert
3
3
234 P.3d 696, 698
assignments of error with particularity and to support his position with sufficient
authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court.
Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on
the findings and conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to
evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. Afichael v. Zehm,
74 Idaho 442, 445, 263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the
record on appeal for error. Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Profl Discipline, 138 Idaho 397,
400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of
error is not argued and supported in compliance with the l.A.R., it is deemed to be
waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005).
Clark v. Cry Baby Foods, LLC, et. at., 152 Idaho 182, 307 P.3d 1208, 1212 (2013); citing to
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790-91, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152-53 (2010). Additionally,

it is well established law that a litigant may not remain silent as to a claimed error
and later raise objections for the first time on appeal. Baramore, 145 Idaho at 343,
179 P .3d at 306. Additionally, substantive issues will not be considered for the
first time on appeal. !d. Accordingly, this Court will not consider any issue on
appeal that [Appellant] failed to properly preserve during trial.
v. Michalk, 148

224,230,220

580,587

should not be allowed to now raise issues before
to the
she were allowed to do so,
raise
support on intermediate
Court's role as an intermediate
court and any credence
its
as well as the
Rules would be rendered

of

district court

appeal

denying
had

to

Specifically, the district court noted as follows:
In this appeal, Ms. Butcher, while appearing pro sc, has filed a
page brief,
with attachments. LR.C.P. 83(v)(Appellate briefs) provides that "briefs shall be
in the fonn and anangement. .. provided by the rules for appeals to the Supreme
unless otherwise ordered
the district court ..... "

While Ms. Butcher is proceeding pro se, "[p ]ro se litigants are not accorded any
special consideration simply because they choose to represent themselves, and
'are not excused from adhering to procedural rules.' Rather, 'pro se litigants are
held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney.'
Therefore, Sanders is not excused from adhering to the rules regarding proper
preservation of issues for appeal and proper presentation of arguments in the
brief, and this Court analyzes the issues by the same standards applied to an
attorney." Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 57, 244 P.3d 197,201 (2010).
"In addition, it must be noted that the appellant has here failed to comply with a
number of provisions of the Idaho Appellate Rules governing presentation of
appeals to this court. For example, the appellant's brief fail to set forth either the
facts involved in this case or the proceedings had below. The brief also fails to
denominate any issues on appeaL .. Absent compliance with the appellate rules,
the court will not review the record for enor. Enor is never presumed on appeal;
the burden of showing it is upon the party alleging it." Jensen v. Doherty, 101
Idaho 810, 911, 623 P.2d 1287, 1288 (1981).
Ms. Butcher's brief fails to comply with virtually all of the
35 concerning a brief on appeal.
has no
cases and authorities, no statement of the case
u".' .... a. section, and no
a fifty page document that is

CR. 987-999.)
cOlTectly noted by the district court, the requirements applicable to an appeal and the
standards applicable to pro se litigants are no different than the standards applicable to attomeys.
s

Rules

the

to identi

issues on appeal and to direct the district court's attention to error in the underlying magistrate
court's decision were fatal to her appeal before the district court,4 and no different than ifshe had
remained silent. Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 58, 244 P.3d 197, 201 (2010)(noting that the
Court will not consider any issue on appeal which was not raised below). Appellant ultimately
left the district court in the position of having to search the record for error which is not its job
and which is never presumed on appeal. Idaho Power Co., v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738,
745,9 P.3d 1204, 1211 (2000). Rather, it was Appellant's burden of showing error, a burden she
wholly failed to meet. Id.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should decline to review the issues presented on
appeal because they were not properly identified, raised, and supported before the district court
capacity below

Appellant should not

to cure

so
create a

court

4

"Issues that

been waived:'
to Suitts

Idaho

- 2-

not

on
can be

court
en-ors

to this

repercussions.
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED ALL OF HER ISSUES ON APPEAL BY FAILING
TO HAVE RAISED THEM BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND BY FAILING
TO ARGUE OR SUPPORT THEM AS REQUIRED BY THE IDAHO

Even if Appellant is not deemed to have waived her right to appeal due to her failure to
comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules on appeal to the district court, there are separate grounds
for this Court to find waiver. Specifically, Appellant identifies six separate issues on appeal, the
first three of which are entirely new arguments not appropriately raised below and the other three
of which lack any art-,JUment or authority in compliance Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6). As is
discussed in greater detail below, all of these issues are deemed to have been waived and should
not be consider as part of the present appeal.
A. Appellant's first and second issues on appeal are deemed to have been
waived because she failed to raise them before the magistrate court.
Appellant's first and second issues on appeal seek to challenge Freddie Mac's right to
enter a credit bid in the underlying Trustee's sale.
court

thus cannot

raised for

These issues were not raised before the

first time on appeal.

a

not

D
L

- 3

as to a

at 588.

at 232,

Issues

time on appeal."

to

first

not

, 306

179

145 Idaho

v.

(2008). Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court will not consider any issue on appeal that was
not properly preserved during trial.

148 Idaho at 230,220 P.3d at 586.

In the case at hand, Appellant in a wholly conclusory fashion alleges that she "presented
\vas not

to

to

credit bid because Freddie Mac was not the owner of [appellant's] Promissory Note as of the
date of the foreclosure sale and that there was no Assignment of Deed of trust in favor of Freddie
Mac recorded in the mortgage records of Ada County." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 9,

~

1.)

Similarly, she contends that she raised "the issue of ownership of the Note in the Magistrate
Court ... " (Id.. pg. 10.)

Noticeably lacking from Appellant's conclusory assertions, is any

citation to the record demonstrating that she in fact raised these issues before the magistrate
court, such that they can now be raised on appeal. This is ultimately because the record reveals
that she made no such argument before the magistrate court and is thus barred from raising the
Issue now.
In fact, the district court
same

to

upholding the magistrate court's ruling was troubled by
on

court transcript

before

to enter a
court

so.

.,

court

- 4-

same

not assert

not

credit bid was not '"\1",""">"

a

it was too low." (R. 993-994.)

magistrate

review of the magistrate court's Order Granting Motion for

Summary Judgment confirms the same

evidences that the only issue before it was whether a

credit bid was a valid means to purchase property at a Trustee's sale under Idaho law, which
(2006),

Court found it was. (R. 557.)
Ultimately, it is not the job of this Court or Respondent to search the record for error or
for support for Appellant's contentions. s That is ultimately her burden and a burden which she
has not and cannot meet. Similarly, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, which is
exactly what Appellant is attempting to do here. Based upon the foregoing, the Court should
decline to review these issues on appeal.

B. Appellant's third issue on appeal is deemed to have been waived because
she failed to raise the issue in the proceedings below.
Appellant's third issue on appeal, which alleges that she was denied a full and fair
opportunity to litigate her claims and defenses to Freddie Mac's motion for summary judgment is
similarly waived because she failed to ever raise
above, a

not

.

Issues

.

111

proceedings below.

as to a claimed error
224,

587

to

,,!,-,aU!H)';"

and

party
"come into court and say a iot of stuff and
13-1
expect the court to sort it out."

a

court

s failure to
action on appeal."

,1

at 23 , 220

a

587.

an

challenging
appealable to

to

Court, there must have been an adverse ruling by the lower court. ld., 148 Idaho at 234, 220 P .3d
at 590; citing to McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391,397,64 P.3d 317,323 (2003).
In the case at hand, Appellant, for the first time argues that her due process rights were
violated by the

court.

court's issuance

a

written ruling granting summary judgment before Appellant filed another 60+ page "Motion Re:
Reply Memorandum," on December 5, 2011 was in error and that she was cut off in oral
argument and thus deprived her day in court. (Appellant's Brief, pg. 15,

~

1.)

Consistent with

her lack of citation to the record to support her other issues on appeal, Appellant makes her
assertions here with absolutely no citations to the record including any evidence from the record
that she ever raised her purported legal issues in the proceedings below either through
appropriate motion with the mabristrate court or on appeal to the district court. This is ultimately
because she did neither and is attempting to raise this argument for the first time on appeaL
Specifically, the record shows that Appellant was given ample time to submit briefing in
opposition to Respondent's motion for

judgment,

the motion and memorandum

28,20

not

November 1, 2011, during

having

no

22,

at

to

s

163-554.)
granting summary

that it

Judgment confirms that it did. (R. 555.) Specifically, the magistrate court noted that "the Court
has indeed considered all

the documents in the attachment submitted by Ms. Bucher and asks

the clerk of the court to treat it as part of the record. The motion is now fully presented to the
decision."

)

The record shows that Appellant did not object to the magistrate court's order as being
premature nor did she ever seek leave to file her December 5, 2011 brief, which was not
otherwise allowed for under I.R.C.P. 56(c).6 (R.2-3.) The record shows that Appellant did not
seek to strike Freddie Mac's reply which she now contends that she did not receive until after the
summary judgment hearing nor did she ask that the magistrate court not consider the filing or
request additional time to respond to the filing. (Id.) Similarly, the record shows that Appellant
did not seek reconsideration of the magistrate court's order in light of the additional briefing she
submitted. (R. 2-3.) Ultimately, the record is devoid of any such requests because Appellant
made none. Instead, on December 9, 2011, four days after the filing of her December 5, 2011
memorandum, Appellant elected to
record before
process"

a 22 page Notice of Appeal to the district court. (R. 624ever

court is
or concerns

hc>Tnrp

brief. "It
the court's
Court Rules." Willnerd v.

allows for the
discretion whether to consider
201
652539
Idaho 20
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to

to litigate

any alleged

claims.
Additionally, contrary to Appellant's characterization that she was cut off during her oral
argument

transcript from that hearing clearly shows that the magistrate comi gave Appellant

ample time to make her arguments and attempted to try to get Appellant to narrow her comments
to

Issues

in the casco

., p. 1

court asked Appellant on a number of occasions whether she had additional arguments giving her
ample opportunity to present those arguments before concluding the hearing. (Id., p. 13:5, 14:9,
15: 18, 16:5.) Similarly, Appellant points to nothing in the record which indicates she ever raised
this issue before the district court and in fact, nothing in the transcript from the appeal hearing
before the district court, shows that it was. (Tr., p. 17:3-26:25, 35: 15-43: 18.)
Again, the present appeal is not the proper place for Appellant to raise new arguments for
the first time. Idaho law is clear that by failing to raise this issue below, she is now barred from
doing so now. As such, the Court should decline to review Appellant's third issue on appeal.
C. Appellant's fourth, fifth, and sixth issues on appeal are also deemed to
have been waived because thev are not properly argued or supported as
required by I.A.R. 35(a)(6).

fourth,
are not

on
",.,"YH'Y

or

- 8-

as

statutes

parts

"issues

the

are not argued and supported as required

the

are

to

waived. Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317. 326, 297 P.3d 1134, 1143
141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 1

(2013); citing to Suitts v.

122 (2005». Similarly, issues

on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and
v.

added); citing to Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health We?fare, 147 Idaho 257, 266, 207 P.3d 988,
997 (2009). The reasoning behind such a rule "lies in the fact that it is the appellant who has
asserted error on the part of the [trial court]. Absent compliance with the rules, this Court will
not search the record for error. Error is never presumed on appeal and the burden of showing it is
on the party asserting it." Idaho Power Co., v. Cogeneration. Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 745, 9 P.3d
1204, 1211 (2000). Thus "regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in the party's
brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported
by an cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court. Liponis v. Bach. 149
Idaho 372, 374, 237 P.3d 696, 698 (2010); citing to Inama v. Boise Coutny ex reI. Bd. Of
Comm'rs. 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450,456 (2003).

foregoing

to

- 9

3

ever
or

district court on

such

court
can

now.

148 Idaho 224, 232, 220 P.3d 580, 588 (2009); citing to Mackowiak v. Harris, 1

v.

Idaho 864,

204 P.3d 504,506 (2009).
Ultimately, neither Respondent nor the Court has any indication
s arguments.

provides no

or

of

tu

to determine what her argument may be or what it may be based upon and as such, Respondent
has no meaningful opportunity to respond. For the above reasons, the Court should decline to
review Appellant's fourth, fifth, and sixth issues presented on appeal which are barred by her
failure to comply with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6).

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION MUST BE AFFIRMED AS A MATTER
OF PROCEDURE BECAUSE THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V FOLLO\V FROM
THOSE FINDINGS.
Even if this Court declines to find that Appellant has waived the issues she is now

attempting to raise on appeal, Appellant appears to only challenge the magistrate court's ruling
and district court's approval of that ruling on one ground, which was
a

at

could

7

it
In

that there is no
to create such

magistrate court,
been

submitted

this

Issue

a

it

to make a fully informed ruling. Additionally, the standard of review is not de novo, but this
Court is instead confined to the magistrate court's findings of fact, based upon the record before
it, and the conclusions of law drawn therefrom. Where Appellant raised no issues before the
court

to

magistrate court made no findings of fact and drew no conclusions of law from which Appellant
can now appeal.
In the proceedings below, the magistrate court was faced with a very narrow issue as to
whether Freddie Mac, pursuant to a validly recorded Trustee's Deed was entitled to possession
of The Property. The magistrate court acknowledged as much in the first line of its written Order
Granting Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 554.) The magistrate court was not faced with any
affirmative requests for relief from the Appellant on any of the grounds she now asserts in her
opening brief, 8 including but not limited to a request that the foreclosure sale be set aside
because Appellant does not believe she was in default, that Appellant believes she was entitled to
a modification of her loan, that Appellant challenged the ownership of her note, or
or was

never

Fargo, an

by

s

15-

loan

a
1S

burden to support her arguments with citations to the record and not the burden of the
to search the record for what she may be
or to demonstrate a lack thereof. In
raised
below or
citations to the record
support such assertions.

-2 -

any

to

case to

record

IS

foregoing arguments are

of

none as

for the first time in this appeal.
reaching its decision on the narrow issue before it, the magistrate court made
appropriate findings of fact based upon the undisputed record before it which included a copy of
to

s

.~

al

interest9 in The Property and entitled Respondent to immediate possession ten days after the sale.
(R. 10-11; R. 557 and 991.) The magistrate court also had before it copies of the various notices
given with respect to the trustee's sale. (R. 72-82, 141-162; R. 557 and 992.) These documents
were undisputed, notwithstanding Appellant's copious amounts of briefing and argument, none
of which contradicted or set forth any evidence for the magistrate court to rely upon in order to
refute the statutory presumptions afforded to a Trustee's Deed under I.e. § 45-1501(1). (R. 994
(noting that "The trustee's deed is prima facie evidence of the validity of the sale, which has not
been rebutted by admissible evidence.").)
The magistrate court's conclusions of law then appropriately followed from its findings
and the undisputed record. Specifically, Idaho law provides that the effect of the undisputed
was to

HV'.Ha,,,-

a credit bid created some

and terminate

Winmill in Laurie Hobson v. Wells
ct.
in the Idaho Trust Deeds act that
of a successful
assignment be recorded.
even if such
of
that "the sale is final once the trustee accepts the bid as
the notice of the sale
VULLUU'M

trust

section 45-1506."

IS

"purchaser at a trustee's sale
following the sale ... "

IS

to possession

the property on

§ 45tenth

45-1506(11). "Vlhen the trustee's deed is recorded in the deed records

of the county where the property described in the deed is located, the recitals contained in the
deed and in the affidavits required under section 45-1506, subsection (7), Idaho Code, shall be
. §

any couli
1510(1).

Furthermore, nothing in the Idaho Trust Deeds Act prohibits the assignment of a

successful credit bid after a foreclosure sale. Laurie Hobson v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., et. aI.,
2012 WL 505917 (D.Idaho 2012).
Contrary to Appellant's assertions in the underlying proceedings of the Idaho Trust
Deeds Act having been repealed, the magistrate court and district court correctly found that the
Idaho Trust Deeds Act has not been repealed. (R. 557 and 992-993; citing to Spencer v. Jameson,
147 Idaho 497, 501, 211 P.3d 106, 110 (2009).) Both courts also correctly found that HAMP
was irrelevant to the proceedings because no private cause of action exists under HAMP and
even if it did, the district court, on appeal, correctly noted that Appellant's own evidence showed
that she was reviewed and denied because she did not comply with the program's directives. (See
990-991,

5
not

'U'-'JlA"',,",

or
'-'" Lnn"J

as to
was

magistrate
means

challenge as to
purchasing a property at a trustee's

Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 44, 137 P.3d 429,431 (2006).

a

was a

it was pursuant to

nf"{,yv'r

v.

Because of the narrow challenge raised by

Appellant in the proceedings below, her attempt to now broaden her arguments to now include
who has standing to submit a credit bid should not be considered by this court, first, because
1S

no

Issue

prejudices the rights of Freddie Mac, which has had no opportunity to introduce evidence or
argument to counter such arguments.
Ultimately, Appellant has pointed to nothing in the record that was before the magistrate
court that demonstrates its findings of fact and conclusions of law drawn from those facts were
inappropriate.

Because the Court must conduct a deferential review where error is never

presumed and "the evidence must be liberally construed in favor of the judgment," this Court
should affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the May 23,2013 decision of the district court affirming the
grant of summary judgment to Freddie Mac, should be affirmed in all respects.
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